Good afternoon. First of all thank you for this invitation. I know I can always count Germain to get into trouble. I mean, this time, being invited here to talk about what I would call impossible the relationship between psychoanalysis (especially Lacan) and so-called political philosophy. In other words, since, to paraphrase a classic all philosophy is political focused on speech in logos -: between psychoanalysis and political without more, between the act of psychoanalysis and the rule (or aspire to do, or act against those who do): no need to remind you that two of the three practices, along with the education, highlighted by Freud precisely as "tasks" impossible. Raising this is-and please, do not believe I am quoting to May '68, a proposal strongly realistic: the impossible, you know, it's real . It is also "realistic" from a point of view, say, "Machiavellian" are tasks that need to take men for what are, not what we want to be. This also is impossible: we will always have the Ideal ahead velándonos reality. And, barring any appeal or mystical poetizante the "ineffability of the unspeakable" or something like that, except that, from what I instinctively distrust, who said he can not speak of the impossible? In any case, analysts and analysands particular, the pass is just talking about the impossible-not saying, of course, coming to him talk is to avoid it, but saying between the lines, enunciating the inter-dicto -. The problem is that as I am not either of those two things, neither analyst nor analysand, I have to take a more indirect route of approach.
As an apologist for introducing the topic going to let me quote two good friends, with
which ground to discuss the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics, particularly in the form of Marxism. Assure that people are real, there, and I am reproducing their arguments with the utmost fidelity to the misunderstanding of the language I may. The first one reads me: me, psychoanalysis seems to me an extraordinary theory, irrefutable, with which I totally agree, except for one small detail: I do not believe that of castration. The second says something similar but with an inverted symmetry: Marxism is nonsense, not good for anything in mind, all your assumptions are wrong, except for one detail that I find most correct and undeniable, that is the theory of goodwill.
Then, one "removes" full psychoanalysis because it begins to accept it fully except that thingy -nothing less than castration, and the other input you want to cancel Marxism, we end up completely also , precisely because the other thingy. That is, one would spare castration to fully accept the theory of psychoanalysis, the other will lack all Marx's theory of surplus value but to accept Marxism. In both cases there is a detail not close them. No need to dwell too much on this to note that this detail, this "little piece" that nadita, is in each case, if I may use a term of Spinoza on which I want to return, the absent cause holding Thus the whole theory of Marx and Freud. Theories, of course, nobody has to accept, but without those little simply do not exist details Ian. Now, if this is so, you think there should be some relationship between, on one side and I quote that "stone of scandal that is supported only by giving up the completeness of the subject" is as defined by Lacan, among other ways, castration, in his text The subject finally questioned, on the other side "that silliness disguised by false fog of economic complexity, which is how Marx refers to the gain in the preface to Capital .
should be, say, between those two things, a relationship must have to do with the fact that nte underline here to deny the castration to stay with their theoretical implications, which is what my first friend, or conversely, to deny the full implications of goodwill to stay only with her, as the second character, are operations symptomatically could produce that, quote again, "truth-telling in the failure of a knowing" that Lacan also refers in the text above. I insist: if so, there must be some connection between this unlikely tale of castration and the trivial triviality of goodwill. But to say that there must be some relationship does not mean I know what it is. Because, it's time to make a confession brutally no less brutal: more than thirty years n or I can understand the relationship between goodwill and joy as. Explained to me on several occasions, including the same germ, but no case. As they say, the unconscious continues to not sign, I can not stop not understand that relationship. To make matters worse, I recall that Lacan himself says that between those two points is a non-analogy, but homology, ie they are the same, each record in the corresponding theoretical discourse.
S o E someone might ask: why the intervention began out there, if you do not understand? Well, it's because I have the intuition that it is in those details, which are those small differences, which can operate at all precisely because both offenses , all want to know anything with them.
is in that, then where is the explanation, is a hypothesis of strict incommensurability of theory, practice and above all, psychoanalytic any other political philosophy. I say "another" because I think there policy specifically psychoanalytic theory, that is, as it were inscribed intaglio in psychoanalysis. And when I say "psychoanalysis" (and when I say "Marxism"), course theories I do not mean "pure" but "if you'll excuse the Althusserian-turning a bit about theoretical practices are inseparable from a practice theories, ie, in the strict sense, even Greek, some forms of praxis . I will come back on this and also about the relationship between psychoanalysis and Marxism, which I think works other than with what might be called political philosophy in general.
For now I would risk the following: at the very beginning of Mass Psychology Freud says there is an individual psychology that all psychology is social or collective constitutively. This statement is introduced, necessarily, the order of the political in the broadest sense. Moreover, say the political in the broadest sense of the modern , since it is in modern-especially since the French Revolution to the masses, the multitudo of Spinoza or whatever name they are , enter and could even say that invade public space. Ie the "invention" of psychoanalysis and the discovery of the unconscious as a theoretical category are inseparable from the modern (not just for this, of course, also because the Cartesian subject was required to devise its counterpart "split" and many other things, but now we are talking about this.) However, the main references of Freud-just think of the Oedipus of Sophocles and the other tragedies - the classic Greek tragedy that Steiner and others said it was impossible in modernity, such references, I say , are not exactly modern. Is true that in the texts "aesthetic-cultural" Freud found many other references that may be considered "modern" in the broadest sense-from the Renaissance of Leonardo and Michelangelo, through the Baroque to the full Shakespearean "modernism" of Dostoevsky , to give examples thicker-but none of them (with the arguable exception of Hamlet) has a role, say, founding of the very logic of the unconscious that has ancient tragedy "Oedipus" is not a case more "applied psychoanalysis", but the instrument same theoretical and practical that produces psychoanalysis as such.
Then, with these references would seem that psychoanalysis would create a difference inarticulable for the evolution of historiography, which is the dominant conception of culture "bourgeois" Western European (and does not come, as they say, exactly the "linearity" Judeo-Christian, which is much more complicated): a sort of hiatus chronological, historical, within modernity itself: a kind of mishap to make a bad pun. I mean, that with the application of the "anti-historical" unconscious of psychoanalysis introduces a gap that can not be recovered by the philosophies of the quintessentially modern history, and taken to its ultimate consequences in Hegel for example, that philosophy is linear , evolutionary, teleological, which generally depend on modern political theories, to the emergence of the modern state with its new ways of exercising power, must demonstrate a complete break with the old, archaic, "a-historical "or at least" pre-modern "(the prefix pre , as the prefix post , are symptomatic of this ideological / teleological / ogy : "modernity" is always, as it were, the unit of measurement and arrival point, either because we are moving it in the "pre "or you've already passed a" post "which is the" end of history "in any case, then, modernity is the culmination historical-evolutionary). So here it I would dare to make an analogy: I think that this mismatch, this plus not systematized by modern political philosophies replica in terms of history of ideas that other plus we talked about recently, that is, the excess or that supplement , significance that did not mean to speak Kristeva mode, which involves the real of a singularity that is not articulated by the mere historical knowledge and theoretical.
Of course not all political theories, including modern, are equal. Should distinguish those for which the political construction is the work of the single, pure and lofty reason - those between the empiricists Locke and Hume through the Enlightenment to the idealist Hegel that support the privileged place of the passions, I dare to say even drives - as in Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau (who is an "enlightened" very unorthodox, which are next to rationalism whole theory of affections very different that of Descartes) and especially Spinoza, which, moreover, introduces the notion of God as absent cause . With the introduction of which opens a line that makes the lack original and not the completeness in the future the secret of the political.
is an idea that would take too long to discuss here, but it's going to stop in the twentieth century, first to Civilization and Its Discontents in Freud, on the other to Walter Benjamin (a reader of Freud, of course), suggesting the latter a kind of political theology "apocalyptic" very different one hand, that of Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes, for example, says that is exactly the opposite, as in Schmitt's apocalyptic slow it would be as much as possible the final catastrophe, while in the case of Benjamin, as also a Marxist, it is accelerate as much as possible. Then a line is quite different from Schmitt's but also of the theological-political return and "agambenismos" several that are so fashionable lately. And do not use the fashion significant in a pejorative sense but in the sense of its symptomatic value. "Symptom" in this sense is perceived return some time in an almost obsessive preoccupation with Paul of Tarsus, St. Paul or whether they prefer to call it (in their own Taubes and Agamben, in Badiou, in Zizek, in Esposito, etc.). Symptom of what kinds is much more difficult to say. Perhaps a widespread confusion and detachment, but not yet articulated a "new" policy, with the proven ways of doing and thinking what political (whether left or right), and the consequent illusion or desire to rediscover an instance of re-founding of the "social bond". Something, moreover, which may also have claims aspects, as verified in fundamentalisms (today there are several, and not just the Islamic, see U.S., Europe racist sprouts, and so on). So I'm not belittling the "theological-political" is something to be taken seriously, study it, give it due attention.
But as I said, take a long time to develop it, of any so, I hold that this line of passion or "drive" of political theory, not being rational makes his way to register the limits theoretically poses to know a truth not fully theorize. Something that may even be very explicit in Spinoza as an enigmatic truth of the body ("Nobody knows what can a body," says Spinoza famously), and even the truth of a certain animality : recently been translated into Castilian a , although moot, Derrida very interesting seminar about "the beast and the sovereign," which record the enormous amount of metaphors "beastly" resorted to by some modern political philosophies, metaphors referring to this or that real or mythical animal: the "centaur" fox and a lion to the "prince" Machiavellian, the monster is biblical Leviathan Hobbes -that we find in the twentieth century in the aforementioned Carl Schmitt, the wolf again after another Hobbes and Rousseau way, and so on. I think this line of political theory would be able to think more about it-from-the uniqueness material that the animal metaphors, nature, in the order of the real no article on its own theory. But do not let them all anyway to be "pure" theories.
I think the specific difference of psychoanalysis, as should be obvious, is that part of the dimension of the practice . This unique material, plus excessive, as is said, in the case of psychoanalysis is that it can be included or not in theory but, by analogy we could say is the absent cause the theory that articulates by his own theoretical flaw : "failure", as well as those who say "the San Andreas fault, a geological break the theory that if you can not ever be "sewn" given its consistency precisely this inclusion / exclusion of non .
Already it is time to return to what we said in passing that this side is that you would think that all political theories of Marxism is perhaps the one that is potentially in better able to produce such homologies mentioned Lacan, and even at some point we have to point out that Marx was who had discovered theory (we assume that means even properly "analytic") of symptom.
could mention several of these homologies, I'll try to do so quickly and trying to overcome the misunderstandings of the "Freudian-Marxism", that is, primarily, of the approval of the "content" of both theories, suggested, among other things, the metaphor "economic" in the Freudian discourse, thereby creating a double misunderstanding, since Marx is a mere "economic" -. First, as mentioned, the question practice: psychoanalysis and Marxism are the only two grand theories of modernity that base their scientific or theoretical legitimacy on the criterion of praxis . These theories of practice to say it again with the expression of Althusser; and also a practical but not individual masses in the sense that, as we know, two can do and also mass Therefore, what falls to the psychology of the masses is also an implication for psychoanalysis.
Second, not only the homology plus added value and enjoyment (whatever that means) but already in the sixties and early seventies Jean-Joseph Goux (in an important book called Freud, Marx: Économie et Symbolique ), undoubtedly drawing on Lacan, establishing a homology between money as a general equivalent and the universal premise of the phallus, is based on what he called the coin (of course in a different sense than having that "discipline"), a perspective that is fully complementary to the idea of capitalism as a mode of production based on that plus the enjoyment says Lacan. And that also means that capitalism is a system of administration total "(as Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of Enlightenment ), which includes a production of subjectivity very deeply rooted in the unconscious. Maybe that's why it is so difficult to beat.
Third, very easy to check, and a good intellectual exercise to do, be read in parallel all the reasoning of Chapter 1 of Capital on commodity fetishism, and much of Freud, course, but in particular the article on the fetishism of 1927, to verify that the reasoning or logic production of truth is at stake here is remarkably similar. The fetish has to do with the elimination of the production process object-commodity in Marx's case, the object-fetish in the case of Freud. In both cases, and now using the language of Freud, it would appear that the concentration on the object is achieved by filling a memory to retain a pure perception (a complete definition, incidentally, on the rule of synchronicity of images with no history in the "postmodern" media, and others).
therefore, is the fourth point, but derived directly from the latter, emerges in this logic the foundational role of subjectivity that could have the foreclosure, as something which, with other joints and of course in another language, is at the center of a possible Marxist theory of ideology. I say "possible" because Marx did not say much explicitly referring to the ideology, and what he did say explicitly is highly debatable, even in their own language, at least from our current position, where we have the advantage, which could not have Marx, had been reading Freud and Lacan (with "language" I mean as untenable conceptions of a "false consciousness" or metaphor of ideology as camera obscura investing real image, etc.). I think we have to go find more in this first chapter of Capital , although there does not even mention the word ideology , look around, say, something like a logic array the issue of ideology is a much less confident Marx and "framing" of the vulgar Marxists tend to think that shows how this "detail" does not allow the self-consistency of all makes no practical or political theory can never be fully satisfactory, because it will always fail in your kernel. In any case is in the way of that theory as ideology has tried to think from Althusser to Zizek, for example, and encourage me to quote, with appropriate reservations, even before, the notion of bad faith Sartre's Being and Nothingness , an idea that would be interesting to think not a cause but as a history of this line.
I would, at this point to say something new I'm trying to think now, taking into account the activities of this gentleman Stavrakakis that have appeared lately, and in general attempting to start this thing called "left Lacanian" (as is the case between us, Jorge German). Stavrakakis particular concerns almost inevitably to Zizek, Badiou, Laclau, and I think it includes Castoriadis, someone who in this context is a little-fetched, in my opinion. But there is an author, however, seems to me that has suggestive things to say, and that neither cites, which is Frederic Jameson. Surely not cited for being American and Marxist (no less significant that those other authors, with the exception of Zizek, self-qualify any longer as "Marxist", even if they had youth: at most Laclau self-called "post -Marxist", which is somewhat less "Marxist" not be directly). And that is, back to Jameson, a specific book on Lacan ( Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan ) and a book translated here very Benjaminian capriciously with title documents of civilization, barbarism documents, but in the English original is called nothing less than The political unconscious. And that's where he coined the idea of \u200b\u200bclass struggle as the political unconscious of history and modern culture in general, including literature and art.
all with implications for a theory of historicism, even Marxist historicism, are catastrophic because if one takes seriously, even as a metaphor, that of the political unconscious of history, the association is inevitable that famous statement of Communist Manifesto says that the whole history of mankind so far is the history of class struggle. But according to Jameson just established the homology between the class struggle and the unconscious, ie would have to say that if the entire history of mankind is the history of class struggle, the struggle de clases está afuera de la historia –puesto que, como sabemos, para Freud el inconsciente no tiene , en el sentido habitual, “historia”-. Es la condición de que haya historia pero está afuera de la historia, al igual que el inconsciente de Freud está afuera de la historia, o como se ve en esa sugerencia escandalosa de Althusser a propósito de que la ideología no tiene historia. Lo cual no quiere decir, por supuesto, que no haya una historia de las ideologías. Como puede haber, supongo, una historia de las manifestaciones o las producciones del inconsciente, porque la gente obviamente no sueña con las mismas cosas not have the same lapses in other centuries. But in any case the idea that class struggle as the unconscious, which is also absent cause, "examines the myths that Lévi-Strauss , marries badly with any version historicist teleological evolutionary, or "progressive" in history.
Now, to finish-or rather, to put an end, we know that this story never ends, "having established these homologies is a difference, I think, produced by psychoanalysis, the theory Freud, in which Marxism was unsure what to do. Y is for say it fast and wrong, the theme of "origin" of political it, as Freud theorized in Totem and Taboo "mythically", ie the founding act of violence that gives rise to the Act, the religion, the human community as such, the cops based on a ritual of sacrifice, etc. There have written many things about it, some better, some worse -though none that I know, from a distinctly Marxist perspective: there have to René Girard, Walter Burkert, or with texts otherwise very interesting to polemicize Freud sometimes hard to even-up where I think I understand- do not say anything too different. Is that why they are so concerned to differentiate. But in any case, in that "common crime" is a singular act also (indeed, it would be something like the universal-singular of Kierkegaard: an act one and only, which nevertheless always repeated in various forms, and where the appearance of new is just the rate of recurrence ), and that despite being a source lost and unrecoverable systematic returns in the rituals symptomatically , institutions, and then also introduces a plus in the form of structural repetition that Marxism "normal" could hardly tolerate. I mean, even if that Marxism "normal" introduces a significant change in the concept of historical linearity (the idea of \u200b\u200b"uneven and combined development" of a "social formation" where live conflictively different "modes of production"-and therefore different "historicity" - under the control of one of them unstable, and all that), still need to retain some notion of improvement (in the sense of Aufhebung Hegelian at least in its conventional sense) and "progress", even in the form of a discontinuity revolutionary-that is true today does not seem to be on the horizon, "which is necessarily at odds with the logic of psychoanalytic thinking, especially if you think Cultural Discontents or Beyond the Pleasure Principle .
This, moreover, leads me, almost like a slide-free association to another highly sensitive issue, and would have to be the subject of another meeting because we now take too far: the question of power . Because, no matter what anyone says, and with all respect for anarchist theories as well as the fantasies of "changing the world without taking power" and so on, in politics it is always, ultimately, the power . Of course, needless to clarify, the power can be produced, and then get used in very different ways, are certainly not interchangeable or equivalent. And today, possibly in Latin America where they are happening, although timidly, some interesting and novel in this regard. But the power itself is always another to take up the formula- Max Weber's classic exercise of violence (physical or symbolic, that already is not the same) of affirming the power to make you do to others what I think is best. I believe that it has nothing to do with psychoanalysis.
And, now to be concluded, is the question of practical to return to it. Despite the homology that I did, and I'm still holding, between Marxism and psychoanalysis, and going a little more often, I understand perfectly, "I do it myself, too," the utility may have to find a political philosopher in psychoanalysis or particularly in another way to read Lacan's dialectic of master and slave in Hegel, or the possible transpositions of the "discourse of the Master" to the policy, or build a more complex theory of the subject (which of course changes the ways of thinking and do politics), or the already mentioned issue of culture as an upset "structural" in that the policy would have, or like myself, I repeat, I did an interview calling for democracy "object to of politics "(God knows what I meant by that), or as appropriate. But in any case escapes me how transits (let alone of how it comes ), contrarily, to the practice of psychoanalysis to political theory in the same record keeping. In any case if you want to go to another practice, if the issue is significant that the impossible is not recoverable by the general theory or the concept as Adorno would say, maybe you could go to look to literature or art general, or poetry (all practices of a singularity unrecoverable by the codes previously defined), and if it is "lost origin" within the meaning of Totem and Taboo can go look to anthropology or history religions. I think that in this sense political philosophy, including Marxism, I insist, would be the closest, is incommensurable with psychoanalysis. But, as this is precisely another record-none of this of course can be an argument for not being a Marxist or otherwise, or to neglect or pre-deal policy, or do what you believe you have to do to improve the lives of the masses or whatever. Just say a phrase like "Lacanian Left" seem to suggest a landslide almost "natural" Lacanism left, something as problematic as it seems to me that "Heidegger's left." Which of course exists, and is very rich in theory: there are Sartre, Marcuse, Foucault, Derrida, Badiou and many others-including traces of the "question of art" that could be detected in the Frankfurt School, which, with all nuances, could not be labeled as "right." However, there is nothing obvious in Heidegger's Being and left, and I see no such evidence in the case of Lacan. In what to emphasize, rather, is in the tension of the conjunction / disjunction of and : it can be Lacanian and left, and I suppose can be Lacanian and right. What can not, in any case, is a Marxist and right. Although, who knows. Borges would say: it's all so weird ...
Eduardo Grüner.
* presented at the XXIV Colloquium DESCARTES, "Jacques Lacan and political philosophy." Revised and corrected by the author.
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